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OBSERVATIONS

UPON THE LATE

NATIONAL EMBARRASSMENT,

AND THE

PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT

RELATIVE TO THE SAME.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THIS Pamphlet was written previous to the 23d of January; and the publication of the ſame was withdrawn, on account of the national buſineſs having ſince continued in a progreſſive ſtate, and certain important meaſures having been poſitively effected after ſuch publication was begun. The Pamphlet is again offered to the Public, with conſiderable alterations made in it, eſpecially from page 16 to 47, which were become neceſſary for rendering the ſubject ſufficiently intelligible.

BRITISH MUSEUM

A Poſtſcript has been added, containing an explanation of the rights of the Heir apparent, and alſo a ſketch of the oppoſite meaſures of the two oppoſite Parties, in the courſe of the late proceedings.

THE PRESENT

NATIONAL EMBARRASSMENT

CONSIDERED.

THE Queſtions by which the attention of the kingdom is at the preſent time engaged, have been miſunderſtood in regard to three points.

I. The King's preſent ſituation, that is to ſay, his *political* ſituation, has not been conſidered in the propereſt light.

II. The legal claims of the Heir apparent have been miſrepreſented.

III. The legal ſituation and claims of the Parliament, at the preſent juncture, have alſo been miſtated.

The imperfect repreſentations which have been given of the above three queſtions, have cauſed the true exigency of public affairs to be miſconceived: the

real nature of the meaſures to be purſued in the preſent circumſtances, the *quid faciendum* of the political problem, have not been clearly underſtood.

The preſent political ſituation of the King.

THE preſent inability of the King to diſcharge his royal office, has been termed by ſome Stateſmen and Politicians a caſe of *ſickneſs* or *infirmity:* others have compared it to a ſtate of *infancy*. Precedents of the above two caſes have been ſearched for in the Engliſh Hiſtory.

The preſent ſituation of the King cannot be called a ſtate of ſickneſs or infirmity, as theſe words are generally uſed. In a ſtate of ſickneſs, a Man is diſabled from going through certain manual exerciſes, or from performing certain bodily operations. But ſuch bodily operations and exerciſes are not poſitively required from a King: it is enough if he can give *directions*. The Emperor Severus being

confined by the gout, his Sons took that opportunity to revolt: he ſent his Generals againſt them, who defeated them in battle, and brought them priſoners to him. The Emperor diſmiſſed his Sons unpuniſhed; only warning them to remember that it is the *head which governs, and not the feet.*

Even in a ſtate of health, Kings do not bodily perform ſeveral very important operations. They do not uſe to carry their orders perſonally themſelves: they do not uſe to affix their own great or privy ſeals with their own hands: nay, they do not always chooſe to ſign their own names themſelves. It is recorded among other anecdotes of a certain King of France, that, when his Miniſter, who was a Biſhop, brought papers for him to ſign, he uſed to tell the Biſhop, *Sign*, Father, *ſign for me.*

Neither can the King's preſent ſituation be termed a ſtate of *infancy.* A King, in a ſtate of *infancy*, is not poſitively conſidered as being incapable of having a *will:*

he is conſidered as being only incapable of declaring that will: a Guardian is appointed to him, whoſe office is to declare the King's will.

In a ſtate of ſickneſs or infirmity, a King has a *will*; only, he cannot declare it ſo readily and eaſily as the reſt of men are able to do: but the peculiar ſituation of the King, at this preſent time, is poſitively that he *can have no will*. An *infant* King is alſo, in ſome ſenſe, allowed to have a *will*; but he is conſidered as being unable, we have juſt ſaid, to declare this will: a Guardian is appointed to perform the office. To which add, that there is a certain term, or period of time, expreſsly fixed by the law to the *infant* King's inability to declare his will: the day and hour on which this legal diſability is to be ended, are poſitively named. The infant King's *natural* abilities are moreover continually increaſing every day; they become evident before the day of his *legal* ability is expreſsly arrived.

Alſo

Alſo add, that the Guardian appointed to an infant King, is to keep cloſe poſſeſſion of the King's perſon, for fear any other Men ſhould intrude, and preſume to attempt to declare the King's will. This cloſe poſſeſſion of the perſon of an infant King, which is expreſsly required of a *Guardian*, makes it evident that his office is underſtood to be, to *conſult* with the infant King, and *declare* the King's will.—Such cloſe adherence to the King is not to be conſidered as a part of the duty of the Perſon who, in the iſſue of the preſent national embarraſſment, will be intruſted with the exerciſe of the royal authority. This may lead to obſerve, that the word *Regent*, which has become, through general uſe, to imply the ſignification of a King's *Guardian*, will not perhaps be a proper word for expreſſing the office of the Perſon who is to be appointed a Repreſentative to the King.

Neither can the King's preſent ſituation be compared to a common caſe of *abſence*. Two facts have been quoted as being extracted

extracted from Mr. Hatſell's publiſhed Collection of *Precedents of the Houſe of Commons*. In the one inſtance, King Charles II. being taken ſuddenly ill, and unable to open the Seſſion on the day he had appointed, the Queen ſent notice of the circumſtance to the Parliament, at the ſame time naming a day on which ſhe ſaid the King would come. In the ſecond inſtance, King William III. having been detained by contrary winds in his paſſage from the Continent, and thereby prevented from meeting the Parliament on the prefixed day, the Queen ſent information that the King was landed within the realm, and that his delay could not be long. In the firſt-named inſtance, the Queen named a ſhort day on which the King was to appear. In the ſecond inſtance, the Queen ſaid the King was within the realm, and was coming in his own perſon.

But the King's preſent ſituation is widely different from the above-mentioned caſes. No Miniſter can tell where the King is, or when he is to appear again. On the

day

day on which it was expected that the King would have opened the Seſſion, the Miniſters, in both Houſes, ſaid, "they "had been prevented by the ſeverity of "the King's illneſs from approaching his "perſon and receiving his commands." They meant to expreſs themſelves myſteriouſly; and their expreſſions were proper: but they would have given a more accurate deſcription of the caſe, if they had ſaid, *they had ſought for the King, and had not been able to find him.*

The King is *abſent*; and no perſon can ſay where he is to be found. He is abſent; and no man can tell when he will come back. Nay, it is not known whether he will come back. Nay more, in caſe he does come back, it is not known whether he will be able to make himſelf acknowledged to be the *ſame perſon.*

This circumſtance we have juſt mentioned, namely, the proſpect of a difficulty at ſome future time in aſcertaining the King's real *return*, and the true *identity* of his perſon, is a farther perplexing circumſtance added

added to the preſent national dilemma. The proſpect of ſuch difficulty, which is not much thought of as yet, conſiderably increaſes the nicety and importance of the proviſions meant to be made in the preſent emergency.

The inſtance of Don Sebaſtian, King of Portugal, may be mentioned in this place. Having landed in Africa with an army, he diſappeared in a battle he fought againſt the Moors: he remained abſent from his kingdom; no body could tell what was become of him, or whether he would ever return. A few years afterwards two Men made ſucceſſively their appearance, pretending to be King Don Sebaſtian: the Spaniſh Government, who had ſeized upon the Crown of Portugal, cauſed them both to be put to death. A third Man aſſumed the character of Don Sebaſtian; he made his firſt appearance at Venice; as he was kept out of Portugal. The Spaniſh Government demanded his being delivered up to them. The Venetian Senate poſtponed complying with the requeſt

queſt, and appointed Judges to examine into the affair. The Man, as Hiſtorians relate, bore a remarkable reſemblance to King Don Sebaſtian: his voice was acknowledged to be perfectly ſimilar. He produced on his body certain peculiar marks which were known to have been obſervable on King Don Sebaſtian. He ſhewed himſelf informed of certain ſecret negociations that had formerly taken place between the State of Venice and King Don Sebaſtian, and gave a proper account of them to the Judges. Some Hiſtorians have conſidered the affair as having been myſterious and problematic. For ſupporting this opinion it might be alledged, that the Venetians neither would deliver up the Man, nor hurt him: they only ordered him out of their territories. The Spaniſh Government, after they had procured him to be ſeized in ſome other part of Italy, neither brought him to a trial, nor put him to death; and the whole Portugueſe Nation continued to be loud in their complaints, that their lawful King was detained from them: though their

complaints might perhaps be owing only to their diſſatisfaction with being ſubjected to the Spaniſh Government.

The preſent ſituation of the King of England might, in ſome ſenſe, be compared with the caſe of Don Sebaſtian, that is, with the caſe of a King, who is living, and perhaps preſent, but the identity of whoſe perſon is doubtful and queſtioned: we are here ſuppoſing that the Man who aſſumed the character of Don Sebaſtian, might be the real perſon. However, the compariſon is not very exact. The difficulty and perplexity in aſcertaining the true *identity*, or *return*, of the King's perſon, is only a future poſſible period of the preſent national dilemma: a period which is not arrived yet; but may happen. The real preſent political ſituation of the King is ſimilar to the caſe of Don Sebaſtian, while that King was a captive in Africa; a captive in an unknown land, in unknown hands; an acceſs to his perſon being in every reſpect deemed impoſſible, and even not to be thought of.

A ſimilar inſtance of a thorough abſence of a King, occurs in the Engliſh Hiſtory. The inſtance alluded to, is the well-known fact of King Richard I. This King, being on his return from the *Holy Land*, by ſea, was ſhipwrecked near Aquileia, on the northern coaſt of the Adriatic, where he found himſelf under a neceſſity of purſuing his journey to his kingdom, by land, through the dominions of his enemies, namely, the Duke of Auſtria, Leopold, with whom he had had a violent perſonal quarrel in the Holy Land, and the Emperor of Germany, Henry VI. between whom and Richard there was alſo a ſerious cauſe of enmity: in regard to attempting to go through France, it was a ſtill worſe meaſure, as the King of France, Philip, with whom Richard had alſo quarrelled in Paleſtine, was the moſt dangerous enemy into whoſe hands he might fall. In a ſituation of ſo much danger, Richard put on the diſguiſe of a common Pilgrim: but a ſuſpicion or report having gone about the Country that he had landed from the ſhip

that had been wrecked on the coaſt, he was purſued, and obliged to wander ſo far out of his courſe, to the ſouthward, as Raguſa; where he turned to the North again, and at length reached Vienna, ſtill in the ſame diſguiſe of a Pilgrim. At Vienna, the capital Town of the Duke of Auſtria, one of the Duke's attendants knew and aſcertained Richard's perſon; who was ſecretly ſeized. Information of the fact was ſent to the Emperor, who claimed the priſoner; paid Duke Leopold a reward in money; and, upon Richard's being delivered up to him, cauſed him to be ſhut up in a dungeon. The King's Subjects in England were for a long time uncertain of his fate: no news were received about him: only, hopes were entertained of his having been able to land in ſome part of Europe, where he might poſſibly be detained through unaccountable accidents. A French Minſtrel, born in Richard's dominions in France, went in ſearch of his Maſter, through the different parts of Europe; a difficult taſk in thoſe days, when

there was ſo little intercourſe between different nations. However, the Minſtrel, who, we may ſuppoſe, had made many fruitleſs trials of his ingenuity about ſeveral different Caſtles and ſtrong holds, at length fixed his ſuſpicions and endeavours upon the right ſpot, that is to ſay, around the real Caſtle in which Richard was actually detained. The Minſtrel immediately haſtened to England, bringing news that he was poſitively convinced he had diſcovered the ſpot where the King was ſtill living, and might be found. The intelligence brought by the Minſtrel proved to be true. The intereſt of Pope Celeſtine, and afterwards of the German Princes, was exerted to procure Richard's liberty, which was at length effected; the Emperor being compelled to releaſe him; and the King's Mother, Queen Eleanor, went in her own perſon to Germany, where ſhe paid the very large ſum of money which the Emperor exacted for the King's ranſom.

The ſituation of the Engliſh Kingdom, previous to the day the intelligence was brought

brought by the Minſtrel, was, *politically* ſpeaking, the ſame with that in which the Nation is at this preſent time placed.

A King might happen to fall into a caſe of abſence ſimilar either to that of King Sebaſtian, or of King Richard, through a train of circumſtances different from thoſe above recited. For inſtance, in the above-mentioned caſe of King William III. the information received and communicated by the Queen, that the King had landed within the realm, might have been premature; his ſhip might have been forced down the Channel by the violence of the wind, and ſeparated from all other Ships: the King might have been driven by the continuation of eaſterly winds, and the duration of the gale, to ſeek for a place of ſhelter on the other ſide of the Atlantic, or perhaps might have been loſt at ſea. A like accident might have befallen King George II. who was once, in his paſſage from Holland, driven out of his courſe, and did at laſt land with difficulty at *Rye*, in Suſſex. The preſent King, ſome years ago, as the public

lic news mentioned at the time, ſailed from Portſmouth out of ſight from the land. He might have been carried out of the Channel: he might have been either loſt at ſea, or driven to ſome unknown land. If no account had been received of him, Men would have continued for a long time in a ſtate of uncertainty concerning his fate. Hopes would have been at firſt entertained of his having been able to reach ſome European Country: then it might have been thought he had perhaps been caſt, or landed, on ſome of the *Azores*, or weſtern Iſlands: then on ſome unfrequented part of North America: then, at length, on the remoter coaſt of Brazil, or ſome more diſtant ſhore of the extenſive and deſert South-American coaſt; from which there might be a poſſibility of his being able to return. In ſuch circumſtances, the *political* ſtate of the Kingdom would not have been different from what it is in the preſent circumſtances.

A King

A King might alſo be carried off, or ſlain and hid perhaps for ever, by treacherous or lurking enemies, &c.

Enquiries are made after the King's ſituation.

ON the 20th of November the Parliament met, as they had been appointed. No Miniſter could tell where the King was; this was a real abſence: neither did they attempt to ſay whether he would return again. Such was the political ſtate of the Country, on the day when the Parliament aſſembled.

Phyſicians were appointed to make a report of the King's ſituation. They might be conſidered as *Meſſengers*, ſent to enquire after the King, by ſea and land.

The account that was brought and given to the Parliament, was, that there was no reaſon for deeming the King to be dead; that his return might be hoped for; but that his return was uncertain; and no time

might

might be named when he might be expected to be ſeen again.

Proviſions are to be made for the emergency. The Rights of the Heir apparent.

IN ſuch an unforeſeen abſence, or deficiency of the preſence, of the King, it was agreed that the ſtoppage in the Government, ariſing from ſuch abſence, muſt be remedied by ſome means or other.

Two different Parties, or oppoſite ſets of Politicians, were formed on the occaſion. The one Party gave it as their opinion, that the Heir apparent was entitled to *aſſume* the exerciſe of the royal authority directly, as being his *right*.

The manner in which this opinion was in the firſt inſtance proffered, and the turn of the expreſſions with which the ſame was afterwards argued, ſuggeſted an idea of the Prince being inveſted with rights contradiſtinguiſhed from, and oppoſite to, the rights of his royal Father. The argument was taken up in that light by the adverſe Party, or Politicians, who affirmed that the Heir apparent had *no* right to the exerciſe of the royal authority.

Before examining this queſtion, concerning the rights of the Heir apparent, it is proper to repeat the ſtate of facts, as it was publiſhed by the Parliament, and was univerſally agreed to by all Parties: *The King is abſent; but his return may be hoped for.*

In ſuch a ſtate of things, it muſt be confeſſed that the Prince of Wales has no *right* to aſſume the exerciſe of the Royal authority in ſuch a manner as to ſet the King's rights aſide. Since the King is not dead, the rights of the Prince, relative to him, are only *future* rights. The rights of the King muſt be conſidered as ſtill continuing to exiſt: he is abſent; but his rights are preſent: they hinder and oppoſe the rights of the Prince of Wales.

The Prince's ſituation may be compared with that of a Man who is Heir at law to an eſtate, the owner of which is *miſſing*. Till the Heir at law can produce proofs of the death of the Owner, no Tenant will pay rent to him: he can bring nobody to account: nobody will account to him. If thoſe perſons who have advanced that the Prince of Wales had a *right to aſſume* the exerciſe of the royal authority, thereby meant to ſpeak of an unqualified right,

their

their opinion was remarkable, as they did not attempt to controvert the truth of the account that had been publiſhed, namely, that the King might be able again to govern his Kingdom. In ſuch a ſtate of things, the King's ſituation could not properly be compared with the caſe of a thorough or *natural demiſe*, nor could arguments be borrowed from ſuch a caſe.

So long as the Heir apparent does not pledge himſelf, either that the King is dead, or has expreſsly reſigned his royal office to him, the rights of the Prince, conſidered as contra-diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of the King, are only future rights.

Notwithſtanding what is ſaid here, the Prince poſſeſſes *rights*, however:—what theſe rights are, will be attempted to be explained in another place.

Is the Parliament now aſſembled at Weſtminſter entitled to aſſume the royal authority? Are they to be conſidered in the ſame light with the Convention *Parliament who were ſitting at the time of the Revolution in the year* 1688?

THE ſame Party, or ſet of Politicians above mentioned, who denied that the

Prince of Wales poſſeſſed any rights, proceeded one ſtep farther in their opinions; they now affirmed that thoſe rights which the Prince did not poſſeſs, were poſſeſſed by the Parliament, and that the Parliament were empowered to aſſume that royal authority which was denied the Prince. For ſupporting this opinion, the ſituation of the preſent Parliament was repreſented as being ſimilar to that in which the *Convention* Parliament ſtood; who, in fact, aſſumed the royal authority to themſelves, and diſpoſed of the ſame in what manner they thought expedient.

But it is evident that the ſituation of the preſent Parliament is very different from that of the *Convention* Parliament.

In the firſt place, the preſent Parliament are a Parliament called together by a *King*, in conſequence of *Writs* iſſued from a *King*:—whereas the *Convention* Parliament was a ſelf-aſſembled Parliament,—a ſelf-named Parliament, that is to ſay, a Parliament named by the People of their own accord, in conſequence, not of regal Writs, but of *Circular Letters*, promoted round the Country, among themſelves. To which add, that no other period was defined to

the duration of this *Convention* Parliament except their own choice; whereas the exiſtence of the Parliament now met at Weſtminſter, is depending both upon the life and the will of the King.

To this add, that the firſt, introductory, ſtep, taken by the *Convention* Parliament when they met, was poſitively the reverſe of thoſe ſteps which have been purſued by the preſent Parliament. The firſt meaſure entered upon by the *Convention* Parliament, was to proclaim that the THRONE was *vacant:* King James II. was declared to have abdicated his Throne, in ſuch a manner that is was become *vacant.* Inſtead of this, the preſent Parliament have begun their proceedings with declaring that the Throne is *not* vacant; that the King continues to reign; and that it is *neceſſary his authority ſhould be maintained entire.* In fact, the continuation of their exiſtence as a Parliament depends upon the continuation of the authority of the King: ſuch is the condition on which they have been named by their Conſtituents: they cannot declare that the Throne is vacant, without putting an end to their own exiſtence.

The

The ſituation of the Parliament, now met at Weſtminſter, is, in ſhort, the very reverſe to that of a *Convention* Parliament.

A *Convention* Parliament is a *People's* Parliament: the preſent Parliament is a *King's* Parliament.

Have the preſent Parliament, in the firſt ſtage of their proceedings, conſidered themſelves in the light of a Convention *Parliament?*

THEY have at firſt entertained ſuch an idea; as appears from the Declaration iſſued by them in laſt December. In the beginning of this Declaration they mention their Right and Duty, being *now aſſembled, and lawfully, fully, and* freely *repreſenting all the Eſtates of the People of this Realm*; from which it ſeems they intended to act upon the ground of a *free* and independent Parliament, a People's Parliament: but they have preſently dropped this idea of a People's Parliament, and of the *free* independent rights of the People: they have immediately profeſſed an intention to procure the royal aſſent, *the King's aſſent* (if poſſible), in order by it to ſtrengthen their proceedings: they have averred the idea that the

Con-

Conſtitutional authority of the King continues to be entire, and they have *reſolved* to exert themſelves for maintaining this authority in the ſame *entire* ſtate, *in the name of the King*. (The reader will find a copy of the Declaration and Reſolution here alluded to, in pages 39, 40.)

Upon what ground are the preſent Parliament proceeding to aſſume the royal authority?

SINCE they have abnegated the idea of independent rights of the People, and of independent rights of their own, and in ſhort ſince they have averred that the King's authority continues *entire*, they cannot aſſume, or any how meddle with, ſuch *entire* authority, otherwiſe than by virtue of a King's Truſt and Charge to that purpoſe. There is no poſſible method of aſſuming the authority of a Man, eſpecially a King, except by alledging and proving a *Truſt* from him—or if not, by uſing falſe pretences, or even perhaps forgeries. But it is impoſſible to admit the idea of the Parliament of Great-Britain indulging themſelves in any thing like acts of falſhood, eſpecially if the fatal conſequences

ſequences that would reſult from ſo bad an example are conſidered. We are therefore to judge, that, ſince the Members now aſſembled at Weſtminſter, profeſs an intention to exerciſe the royal authority, they think they are truly empowered ſo to do by virtue of the King's *Truſt* and *Charge* to that purpoſe. And, as a proof that they mean to proceed from the King's Truſt, it is to be obſerved that they profeſs a power poſitively to give his *royal Aſſent*; and give it too, which way they pleaſe, and as often as they pleaſe.

How have the Parliament proved ſuch general Truſt from the King?

THEY have proved the ſame, not by means of any *Writing* from the King, expreſſive of ſuch Truſt: the Parliament have grounded the general Truſt they claim, upon circumſtances: they have, it appears, grounded this Truſt upon the circumſtance of the King having originally called them together,—of his having met them at different times,—and of his having appointed them to meet him on the 20th day of laſt November;

vember; on which day they did accordingly aſſemble. Theſe circumſtances ſupply no bad plea or claim: the Parliament have conſidered them as amounting to a King's general *Truſt* for governing his kingdom, and exerciſing his royal authority in his name: this Truſt they have accepted; and they are accordingly preparing to diſcharge the ſame, and exerciſe the royal authority:—or, to ſpeak in the words uſed in the RESOLUTION iſſued in December laſt, they are preparing "to order the *royal* "*Aſſent* to be given in Parliament to ſuch "Bills as may be paſſed by the two Houſes, "reſpecting the exerciſe of the *powers* and "*authorities* of the Crown, in the name and "on the behalf of the King."—This royal Aſſent they deem themſelves empowered to give: and they may of courſe give it as often, and which way, they chooſe.

What is the conſequence of the Parliament having accepted ſuch general Truſt from the King, for governing his kingdom in his name?

IF ſo, if the preſent Parliament have really accepted ſuch high Office and Truſt,

the conſequence is, that the Members of the Lower Houſe muſt be conſidered as having given up their ſeats in Parliament.

How can that be?

IN the firſt place, the ſpirit of the Conſtitution requires it to be ſo; to which ſpirit it is repugnant that the exerciſe of the *legiſlative* and *executive* authorities ſhould centre in the ſame Perſons or ſets of Perſons: it is repugnant to the nature of the Conſtitution that the King's Truſts for exerciſing his royal authority, in his name and on his behalf, ſhould be placed in the whole Houſe of Commons. But this is not all: the *ſpirit of the Conſtitution* has been confirmed, or rather farther extended, by an Act of the Legiſlature, paſſed in the reign of Queen Anne. It has been ſettled by this Act, that, if any Member accepts a mere particular Office of power and Truſt, under the Crown, his ſeat becomes void. (See Blackſtone's Com. Book 1. c. 2.) The acceptation of a general Office, or Truſt, for governing the kingdom in the King's name, with even occaſionally uſing the outward form of his *royal Aſſent*, muſt

ſtill

ſtill more effectuate the diſqualification of Members accepting ſuch a high Office. To which is to be added, that there is no need of a formal diſmiſſion, or reſignation, of Members accepting Offices: their ſeats become *ipſo facto* vacated, upon their accepting Offices.

It may, on this occaſion, be obſerved, that the ſituation of the preſent Parliament now ſitting at Weſtminſter has been repreſented as being ſimilar to that of the *Convention* Parliament who ſat at the Revolution in 1688. The fact is not ſo. But the ſituation of the preſent Parliament is, in one important circumſtance, very ſimilar to that in which the *Long Parliament* ſtood, in the reign of Charles the firſt, after that King had ſurrendered the power of diſſolving them. The peculiar ſituation of the preſent Parliament is, in fact, that they *cannot be diſſolved*; for, they cannot be diſſolved by any Perſon except by *George the third:* he has called them together; he has appointed them to meet: they have met: he is abſent: they are waiting for him; and they are reſolved to wait till his return. In ſuch a ſituation, the preſent Parliament have a favourable oppor-

tunity, it ſeems, for acting the ſame part as the *Long Parliament* did, in the reign of Charles the firſt, that is to ſay, the part of a Parliament that cannot be diſſolved, and who to ſuch an advantage, that *they cannot be diſſolved*, add an allegation of their being poſſeſſed of the King's *Truſt* for governing in his name, and who do, in fact, exert ſuch *Truſt*. The Statute by which it is enacted that a new Parliament muſt be called, after the expiration of ſeven years, ſupplies but a ſlow and diſtant remedy againſt the proceedings of a Parliament acting upon ſuch principles, and even a precarious remedy. For inſtance, the Parliament now ſitting at Weſtminſter might ſay, when the time for the next new Election ſhall come, that they cannot conſider themſelves as being diſſolved, till the diſſolution is effected in the uſual form, by an act iſſued from the King; and in ſhort, that they will not, and ſhall not, be diſſolved by any other perſons, poſitively, than the King himſelf; nor will they diſſolve themſelves. In ſuch a ſituation they might ſtand their ground, and go on, uniting the King's alledged Truſt with their capacities of Repreſentatives of the People, giving the royal

aſſent,

aſſent, and conducting the national buſineſs, in their own way, conſulting the modes of proceeding ſet before them by the *Long Parliament*, iſſuing royal writs and warrants by their own commands, and only adjourning to days of their own chooſing. Such a mode of proceeding, grounded upon a ſuppoſed union of the King's Truſt for governing the kingdom in his name, together with the capacity of Repreſentatives of the People, would certainly be contrary to the *ſpirit of the Conſtitution*. At the ſame time this ſpirit of the Conſtitution can never be fully proved; and therefore it happened that, Subjects, in the reign of Charles the firſt, who had only the ſpirit of the Conſtitution to point at, and dwell upon, in oppoſition to the doings of their *Long Parliament*, were in reality deſtitute of a proper remedy. But the *Legiſlature* has, in latter times, provided ſuch proper remedy againſt the renewal of the like proceedings. The remedy exiſts in that Statute above quoted, by which it is enacted, that if any Members of the Houſe of Commons accept an Office, or Poſt of truſt, under the Crown, they vacate their ſeats. This Statute

tute has in fact provided for the case, or political evil, of a King being surprised into an engagement *not to dissolve* his Parliament, as Charles the first was: though the intention of those who framed the Statute was not perhaps positively directed that way. Should a Parliament now happen to be so far emboldened by the advantage of *indissolubility*, any how obtained, as to positively alledge a King's general Trust for governing his kingdom in his name, the consequence, since the passing the above Act, is, that their seats, as Representatives of the People, become vacated, on account of their having jointly accepted a *Trust* and a most important one too, under the Crown.

The Members of the present Parliament, by accepting the above most important Trust, as it is evident they have from their above quoted Declaration issued in December last, must be considered as having placed themselves in that state of disqualification just mentioned. After accepting the high Trust and Office of governing the kingdom in the King's name and on his behalf, they must be considered in the same light, at least, as if they had jointly and severally accepted the *Chiltern Hundreds*.

It muſt be obſerved that the high Office and Poſt of Truſt under the Crown, the Members of the preſent Parliament have jointly accepted, is greatly higher than that of Lords of the Treaſury, or Lords of the Admiralty, or Maſters of the Board of Ordnance. Their Office is in reality to be joint *Lords Juſtices of the Kingdom*. In the year 1695, King William, being preparing to paſs to the Continent in order to command the Allied armies, he named ſeven Lords Juſtices of the Kingdom, to whom he truſted the repreſentation of his perſon; the whole power being lodged in any *four* of them. Biſhop Burnet remarks that theſe ſeven Lords were careful not to appear in any company in the number of *four*; but did ſo only at the *Board*, when it was neceſſary. (See Burnet, IV. pag. 217. 218.) The Members of the preſent Parliament are Joint *Lords Juſtices of the Kingdom*, like unto the Lords Juſtices of King William; having the regal authority veſted in them, to uſe Biſhop Burnet's expreſſions, together with the repreſentation of the King's perſon; and exerting a power of appointing any ſmall number of perſons, or Lords, to act as Officers

ficers to them, in order to go through the outward forms commonly uſed for giving the royal Aſſent, whenever there may be occaſion for ſuch aſſent to be given with full ceremony, pomp, and formality.

To which add, that the preſent Lords Juſtices of the Kingdom are poſitively and completely left to follow their own diſcretion in the diſcharge of their high Truſt: which was not the caſe with the ſeven Juſtices of King William: they took care, Biſhop Burnet obſerves, to do nothing *except in matters of courſe*; and only uſed "to tranſmit the King's orders, to which they adhered exactly."

But the Members now aſſembled at Weſtminſter are entruſted with the managing and exerciſing of the royal authorities, in an unconfined manner, without any limitation of time.

They are King's Joint Truſtees *cum liberâ*; giving his *royal Aſſent*, on what occaſion, and in what form and which way they pleaſe.

They are King's Joint Lieutenants *cum liberâ*; not for any particular and ſingle County; but for the whole Kingdom of Great-Britain: they are the King's univerſal

ſentatives. All theſe are certainly Offices both of great truſt, and of great advantage, honour, dignity, and profit.

By accepting the above high Office, of *King's diſcretionary Lieutenants* and *Truſtees*, and univerſal Repreſentatives of the King, the Members of the preſent Parliament muſt be conſidered as having vacated their *ſeats*, both by virtue of the *ſpirit of the Conſtitution*, and by virtue of the above-mentioned Statute: the acceptation of ſuch an high Office and diſcretionary Lieutenantſhip muſt needs be of more importance for vacating ſeats in Parliament, than the acceptation of that nominal Government under the Crown, the *Chiltern Hundreds*.

It has been obſerved, in a former page, that the mere *accepting* of Offices is ſufficient for the effectual vacating of *ſeats*: the King's declaration, or any ceremonial forms of *diſmiſſion* or *diſſolution*, are poſitively not requiſite. The expreſſions in the Act are, "And a new writ ſhall iſſue "for a new election, as if ſuch Perſon, ſo "accepting, was naturally dead."

Nay, the Members now aſſembled at Weſtminſter have done more than barely accepting the Office of King's *univerſal*

Truſtees: they have already entered, it appears, upon the diſcharge of the Office.

They have already begun to diſpoſe of the places of honour and profit in the King's houſhold.

They have alſo begun to make proviſions relative to granting the honour of Peerage, and alſo concerning penſions and places for life, or in reverſion, &c. :—theſe proviſions are to laſt till the King's Truſtees ſhall think proper to alter them, and to provide *otherwiſe* by means of freſh different Bills, with the *royal aſſent* to them; which *aſſent*, it ſeems, they have an unlimited power to give.

The King's *univerſal Truſtees* have alſo begun to make regulations relative to the King's private pecuniary property, and beſt management of the ſame.

To the above conſiderations ought to be added, that the Members of the preſent Parliament, now that they have accepted the above high and profitable Offices, are without an opportunity of getting themſelves re-elected to their ſeats; for, who ſhall iſſue the neceſſary *Writs* for ſuch re-elections, or elections? It may be ſaid, the Members will cauſe the *Writs* to be iſſued by

by virtue of their own commands, and by an exertion of that high diſcretionary Joint *Truſt* which is veſted in them. But it is much to be doubted whether the Conſtituents will regard Writs iſſued in this manner: they will object that the King cannot be conſidered as having had any ſhare in iſſuing theſe Writs; that his authority has been declared *to be interrupted*. A few Conſtituents will perhaps ſay, they are proper Writs: the others will continue to inſiſt that they are not; that the ſame Perſons ought not to repreſent both the Crown and the People: battles and feuds will take place in every County and Borough; and the Joint Lords Juſtices of the Kingdom, and diſcretionary *Truſtees* of the King, inſtead of ſucceeding in getting themſelves re-elected to their ſeats, will only raiſe civil wars in every diſtrict.

Nay, it might perhaps be averred, that the Members now aſſembled at Weſtminſter, are poſitively incapable of being re-elected to their ſeats, ſuppoſing they were to attempt ſuch re-elections.

In the firſt place, being King's Joint Lieutenants for the whole Kingdom, they are excluded by that Act of Parliament which

prohibits Lieutenants of Counties from interfering in elections.

Being Joint Lords Juſtices of the Kingdom, they are alſo excluded from Parliament by that ſame proviſion which excludes Sheriffs of Counties, Mayors and Bailiffs of Boroughs, from being elected within their own juriſdictions.

The Members now at Weſtminſter may alſo be conſidered as being totally excluded by an article in that ſame Act relative to parliamentary excluſions we have above quoted. The expreſſions in this article are, "That no Perſon who ſhall be inveſted "with any Office or Place of profit whatſo-"ever, under the Crown, created or erected "poſterior to the 25th of October, 1705, "ſhall be capable of being elected, or ſit-"ting as a Member, in any Parliament "which ſhall be hereafter ſummoned and "holden:"—this article has been farther explained by a ſubſequent Act, paſſed in the reign of George II. for the expreſſed purpoſe of "*Farther limiting and reducing* "*the number of Officers capable of ſitting in* "*the Houſe of Commons.*" Now, it might be affirmed that the high diſcretionary Office with which the Members now ſitting

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at Weſtminſter are entruſted, namely, the Office of governing the Kingdom in the King's name and on his behalf, and giving his royal aſſent, whenever and which way they pleaſe, to Bills framed and propounded by themſelves, is an Office *perfectly new* in the Conſtitution of the Kingdom: it is an Office undoubtedly created or erected poſterior to the 25th of October, 1705: it is, in ſhort, an Office quite newly and lately erected. The Office is different from that aſſumed by the Members of the *Long Parliament*, in one very capital, eſſential, point; which is, that the *Long Parliament* were acting in the King's name, evidently *againſt* the King; whereas, the preſent Members profeſs themſelves to act in the King's name, *and on his behalf*. (See the *Reſolution* of December laſt, hereafter inſerted, page 40.)

One more deciſive circumſtance may be mentioned, as giving cauſe to think that the Members at preſent aſſembled at Weſtminſter are excluded from Parliament: this circumſtance is, their having begun to make proviſions relative to the beſt management and the ſafety of the King's private property, the putting it out to leaſe, &c. it

thence appears that the Members conſider the management of the King's property and revenue as being part of their *Truſt:* therefore, they may be conſidered as being alſo excluded from Parliament by virtue of thoſe jealous proviſions repeatedly made for excluding Officers of the *Revenue* from being Members in any Parliament.

In ſhort, the King's *Truſt*, poſſeſſed by the Members now aſſembled at Weſtminſter, is *univerſal:*—it is unlimited, and extends to every thing: they can frame Bills upon any ſubject, and give the *royal aſſent* to any Bills they pleaſe, which way they pleaſe.

Theſe things being ſo, it may be obſerved that the preſent Parliament at Weſtminſter have no occaſion for a Regent: they have all they can want: they are the *Regent* themſelves.

Nay, they are more than a Regent: they do not barely repreſent the King's *will*, as a *Regent* would; but they actually repreſent his preſence and his *Perſon*; giving his *royal aſſent* with the outward form of his preſence, by means of a certain number of Perſons, or Lords, appointed for that particular purpoſe, whenever uſeful, and acting under the direction of Parliament. In ſuch a

ſtate

ſtate of things, nothing is wanting for the proper government of the Country: the King is preſent by his high and univerſal Truſtees: both his government and his preſence are continued by his full Truſt; in the ſame manner as if he was only on a journey to Holland or Hanover. The Parliament have contradicted themſelves, when, claiming ſo full and extenſive a Truſt from the King as that which they hold forth, they have ſaid that the perſonal exerciſe of the royal authority is *interrupted.*

The contradiction juſt pointed at, leads us to obſerve, that the whole management of the preſent important national buſineſs, ſeems to be grounded upon ſome kind of conſiderable error. The two DECLARATIONS and the RESOLUTIONS iſſued by the two Houſes, as the ground-work of their proceedings, in December laſt, offer a ſeries of contradictions: the ſecond article contradicts the firſt; and the third contradicts the ſecond. The following is a copy of thoſe three Articles or Declarations.

" I. That it is the opinion of this Com-
" mittee,

" That his Majeſty is prevented, by his
" preſent indiſpoſition, from coming to
" his

" his Parliament, and from attending to " public buſineſs; and that the perſonal " exerciſe of the Royal Authority is there- " by for the preſent interrupted."

" II. That it is the opinion of this Com- " mittee,

" That it is the Right and Duty of the " Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Com- " mons of Great-Britain now aſſembled, " and lawfully, fully, and freely repre- " ſenting all the Eſtates of the people of " this Realm, to provide the means of " ſupplying the defect of the perſonal " exerciſe of the Royal Authority, ariſing " from his Majeſty's ſaid indiſpoſition, in " ſuch manner as the exigencies of the " caſe may require.

" RESOLVED,

" That for this purpoſe, and for main- " taining entire the Conſtitutional Autho- " rity of the King, it is neceſſary that the " ſaid Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and " Commons of Great-Britain, ſhould de- " termine on the means whereby the Royal " Aſſent may be given in Parliament to " ſuch Bills as may be paſſed by the two " Houſes of Parliament, reſpecting the " exerciſe of the powers and authorities of " the Crown, in the name and on the be- " half of the King, during the continu- " ance of his Majeſty's preſent indiſpoſi- " tion."

December 16—29, 1788.

In

In the first of these Articles the King's authority is represented as being only *interrupted for the present time*. This position of the fact was grounded on the report collected and published by the Parliament themselves, purporting that the King might possibly recover: the meaning of the article was that the King was not to be deemed either to be dead, or to have resigned; but that he continued to reign; and the Parliament called by him were not *demised*. Now, the Second Article immediately contradicts that idea, of the Throne being *filled*, and introduces the notion of a *Convention* Parliament; a notion which cannot exist but in the case of the Throne being *vacant*. The right and duty of the Parliament now assembled, lawfully, fully, and *freely* representing all the Estates of the People, are held forth, in this second Article; but neither the Parliament, nor their Constituents, nor the People, can alledge any *right*, so long as the Throne is not *vacant*. In order to talk of the rights of the People, a *vacancy* of the Throne

muſt be effected firſt, or at the leaſt, it muſt be firſt profeſſed or declared.

In the Third Article, ſuch *vacancy* of the Throne is poſitively contradicted: ſo far from its being declared, it is on the contrary poſitively averred that the Throne is *not* vacant, and that the authority of the King ſtill continues: the profeſſed deſign of the Article is poſitively to maintain this authority in an entire ſtate, inſtead of vacating it.

The deſign of this Third Article is moreover to provide the means of giving the *royal aſſent* in Parliament to ſuch Bills as may be framed. But ſince a poſſibility of giving the *royal aſſent* exiſts, it follows that the King is *repreſented*, and the *exerciſe* of his authority is not interrupted: the concluſion of this Third Article therefore contradicts the Firſt Article, in which it is affirmed that the exerciſe of the royal authority is interrupted: ſo long as there exiſt perſons who can lawfully give the *royal aſſent*, the exerciſe of the royal authority cannot be ſaid to be interrupted.

It

It has been above obſerved that the preſent Parliament aſſembled at Weſtminſter, being conſidered as a *Long Parliament*, are different from the Long Parliament in the reign of Charles I. in that the preſent Parliament poſitively profeſs to act in the name of the King, *and on his behalf*. The following peculiarities may be obſerved of the ſame preſent Parliament, conſidered as a *Convention* Parliament; namely, that the preſent Parliament are not a very violent *Convention* Parliament; for, inſtead of declaring the reigning King to have forfeited his rights and thoſe of his family, to perpetuity, they take care even to ſave his private property for him. They are ſo far from declaring that the Throne is *vacant*—they are ſo little diſpoſed to proceed without the co-operation of the reigning King, that they have begun with profeſſing a *Reſolution* "to determine about the means how to procure his royal aſſent," and procure it too, in his name and on his behalf.

As another peculiarity in the proceedings of the preſent Parliament aſſembled at Weſtminſter, it may be mentioned that they have held out a deſign of *maintaining entire the Conſtitutional authority of the King* (See the Third Article of the Declaration

and Reſolution above quoted); and yet, they are now expreſſing intentions to parcel out that authority, and ſever the whole royal houſhold from the main trunk of it.

Again, the preſent Parliament have complained in the firſt Article of their *Declaration*, that the royal authority is interrupted; and what have they ſince ſaid they would do for remedying this inconvenience? they have ſaid they would increaſe this interruption ſtill farther; they have begun to take meaſures, it ſeems, for *interrupting* thoſe important branches of the royal authority, the power of creating Peers, and the power of granting rewards and places. Theſe two powers the Parliament are about to *interrupt* for *three years*, or rather during their *own pleaſure:* inſtead of helping the royal authority to go on, they wiſh to cramp it ſtill worſe; inſtead of remedying the ſtoppage of the royal powers, they prolong the interruption of them.

The great pains taken by the Parliament, for the purpoſe of appointing a *Regent*, may alſo be mentioned as another ſurpriſing inſtance of their proceedings: what need may they have of a *Regent*, ſince they profeſs ſo full a power as that of giving, at any time, the royal aſſent to Bills framed by themſelves?

The

The nature of the power and political ſituation of the Parliament.

IT would be an attempt of no great ſervice, to endeavour to explain the contradictions in the proceedings of the Parliament. This, however, ſeems to be fact (at this day the 20th of January, 1789) that they poſitively mean to aſſert the power claimed by them in their Reſolution, namely, the power of giving the *royal aſſent* to Bills framed by themſelves, aſſuming "the powers and authorities of the Crown, in the name and on the behalf of the King." They will, of courſe, frame new Bills, and aſſent to them, as often as they pleaſe, upon whatever ſubject they pleaſe. And it is probable that a certain number of Perſons, or Lords, will be occaſionally appointed to act as *Officers* to the Parliament, for the purpoſe of declaring this *parliamentary aſſent*; which parliamentary aſſent will be called the *royal aſſent*, by way of greater ſolemnity.

So full a power claimed by the preſent Parliament (lawfully no doubt), ſhews the extreme extenſiveneſs and fulneſs of the *Truſt* placed in them by the King. At the

ſame

ſame time, it is to be obſerved that this extenſive power and Truſt, poſſeſſed by the Parliament, of giving the royal aſſent as often as they pleaſe, to their own Reſolves of any ſort, includes, in a kind of *epitome*, the whole *maſs* of thoſe ſeparate Offices of truſt and profit which ſeverally operate as diſqualifications from having ſeats in Parliament. Such an extenſive, collective power amounts to an univerſal *Juſticeſhip of the Kingdom* — an unreſtrained joint Commiſſion to govern the Kingdom without limitation of time. And therefore, if the Members of the Parliament now met at Weſtminſter, mean to accept the above deſcribed Office, they muſt remove from St. Stephen's Chapel, and ſettle themſelves in ſome other part of the Fabric, in order there to perform this Office of univerſal Juſtices, and unreſtrained High joint Commiſſioners of the Kingdom.

To which add, that the Members giving up their ſeats in St. Stephen's Chapel, will perhaps prove no reaſon for making afterwards their univerſal Juſticeſhip, and unreſtrained joint Commiſſion to govern the Kingdom, paſs ſmoothly and unoppoſed. The generality of the People

will perhaps obſerve that the circumſtance of the King having appointed the preſent Parliament to meet him on the 20th of laſt November, cannot poſſibly be mentioned as a ſufficient ground for aſſuming ſo extraordinary a Commiſſion, without limitation of time: yet, the mere accepting, or avowed intent to accept, a Commiſſion, vacates the ſeat; whatever the event, or ſucceſs, or profits, may afterwards turn out to be: ſo that it may happen that the preſent Members, after vacating their ſeats for the ſake of the Commiſſion, will not perhaps be able to make the Commiſſion good at laſt.

The real preſent ſtate and political ſituation of the Parliament now aſſembled at Weſtminſter.

THEIR real ſituation is as follows: the fact is, that they cannot be diſplaced or diſſolved: they have it perfectly in their power to ſay that they will not be either diſſolved,

diſſolved, or governed, by any perſon except George the Third: they may oppoſe and prevent any Government from being formed: ſo long as they keep upon that ground, they are ſafe:—but, when they proceed farther, and, inſtead of barely oppoſing the forming of a Government, they proceed to form one, with themſelves, claiming powers and Commiſſions from the King for that purpoſe, even a power to give the royal aſſent, they fall within the reach, or ſphere of action, of the Acts paſſed ſince the reign of Queen Anne, relative to the diſqualification of Members; they give up their preſent advantage of not being to be diſſolved; they, in ſhort, diſmiſs themſelves, and diſſolve their *indiſſolubility*.

What is the conſequence to be derived from the preceding pages?

THE conſequence to be derived from the whole of the preceding obſervations, is, that the Members now aſſembled at Weſtminſter cannot avail themſelves of the preſent

ſent national emergency for gratifying their own private ambition with any probability of ſucceſs: their endeavours that way can only in the end terminate in leaving the Nation without a Parliament at the preſent difficult juncture, and throwing things into confuſion.

What does the public good require in the preſent circumſtances?

THE public good requires that the National buſineſs ſhould be enabled to go on; and for that purpoſe it is neceſſary that a Government ſhould be ſettled.

The ſtate of the National caſe is as follows: The King is abſent: at the ſame time he is abſent in ſuch a manner that he cannot poſſibly give any directions: he is out of the way; he is poſitively *miſſing*. To which is to be added, that his *abſence* was totally unforeſeen by him: it is the peculiar misfortune of his ſituation that he could not poſſibly make any previous

 proviſions

proviſions for the caſe of his abſence; as Kings always uſe to do, when preparing to abſent themſelves for any conſiderable time from the ſeat of their government. The King has left no directions whatever concerning what is to be done in his abſence, nor in any ſhape appointed or commiſſioned any perſons who can repreſent him, at leaſt for ſome ſhort time, in the beginning. His abſence is more complete than that of King Richard; for, King Richard had foreſeen his abſence, in the firſt inſtance, and at firſt provided for it, by leaving two *Juſticiaries* of the Kingdom, to whom he continued to ſend ſome ſort of directions from the *Holy Land:* theſe two Juſticiaries continued to repreſent him for ſome time after it was known that the King was *miſſing*; till they were interrupted in the manner that will be mentioned in the ſequel. But the King has left no ſuch beginning of proviſions, however imperfect, for the caſe of his abſence: his Miniſters do not offer to produce any kind whatever of proviſions made by him, nor name a day

when

when he is to be expected to appear again: all that can be ſaid of him, is, that he is not dead. Since he is not dead, a Succeſſor to him ought not to be acknowledged as yet: but the national good, in the mean time, muſt be provided for: things cannot ſafely remain at a ſtand for any length of time: a *Repreſentative* to the King ought therefore to be agreed upon, for diſcharging the King's office; though in the King's name, ſince he is not dead.

It ought to be obſerved that a certain particular qualification is eſſentially requiſite, in the preſent circumſtance, for conſtituting a proper Repreſentative of the King.

What qualification is eſſentially requiſite for conſtituting a proper Repreſentative of the King?

THE eſſential qualification is, that he muſt be able to procure the ratification of the next Succeſſor to the Crown, or the

next King, for every thing that is meant to be tranſacted in future. This circumſtance ſhews that the Prince of Wales is the only Perſon who can be agreed upon, at the preſent juncture, as a proper Perſon for diſcharging the royal office; for he is certainly the only Man who can inſure the ratification of the next King, and next Succeſſor to the Crown.

This importance, at all events, of ſecuring the ratification of the next Succeſſor to the Crown, and binding him to abide by, and for ever obſerve, every tranſaction of the Government, is the ſecret reaſon why this next Succeſſor is always reſorted to, if capable, as the moſt proper Perſon to fill the office of a *Regent*, in the caſe of an infant King: notwithſtanding the moſt weighty objections at firſt ſight ſeem to offer againſt truſting the very precarious life of a child, perhaps only one or two years old, and truſting it without reſtrictions, in the hands of the very Perſon who is to derive the whole tempting advantage that is to ariſe from the *diſappearance* of

of the infant. The importance of ſecuring the ratification of the next apparent Succeſſor cauſes ſuch objections or conſiderations to be over-ruled; even though there is no poſitive certainty of this apparent Succeſſor coming afterwards to the Crown; for, the infant King may both live, and have progeny.

But the ſituation of the Prince of Wales is remarkable. In the courſe of nature, it is to be ſuppoſed he will outlive his royal Father: no poſſible Heirs or Perſons can, according to the Law of the Country, intervene between him and the Crown, or between him and the King, George the Third.

Nay more, the perſonal importance of the Heir apparent is greatly increaſed by the peculiar nature of the preſent emergency: for, who knows but the Heir apparent is perhaps even already *George the Fourth?* If his royal Father happens never to be able again to govern, who knows but the Prince's Lawyers will adviſe him to reckon the beginning of his reign from the 20th

day of laſt November, the day on which the inability of his royal Father to go on with his royal office was avowed to the Nation? King Charles II. did not reckon the beginning of his reign from the year 1660, the year of his *Reſtoration*, but from the year 1648: the year of his Reſtoration is called the 12th year of his reign, both in all Hiſtories, and in Acts of Parliament. The Prince's Lawyers will perhaps ſay, that, ſince the King never recovered, the Prince's *Kingſhip*, till the day of his Father's natural death, was only kept in ſuſpence; that his *reign* in reality commenced on that day when his royal Father diſappeared to the Nation and to Mankind; in the ſame manner as if a King had been miſſing through accidents at ſea, his next Heir would date the commencement of his reign from the day on which the King was ſeen for the laſt time by the laſt Mortal who can give an account of him.

The above conſiderations ſhew, that the Prince of Wales cannot be left out of any ſyſtem that may be adopted for governing the

the Nation in the preſent circumſtances: his co-operation is indiſpenſable for the certainty both of foreign and domeſtic tranſactions: without him no Acts of Parliament are to be relied upon: nay, without him, the very expenditure of the public money may fail of its intended efficiency; for, who knows but thoſe who may have accepted it, may be made in time to refund it, as having received it from hands that had no buſineſs with the diſpenſing of it?

Is it proper the Prince of Wales ſhould have Aſſociates in his office of repreſenting his royal Father, and exerciſing the royal authority?

THE nature of that office or buſineſs the Prince of Wales may be called upon to undertake, will decide the queſtion.

What is the nature of that office or buſineſs? It may be defined in two words; *it*

it is, to produce ſtrength and ſtability by producing union.

Now, if a certain number of Aſſociates are joined to the Regent, under the name of a *Council of Regency*, this Council will be liable to diſagree among themſelves: therefore, how will they ſecure a proſpect of bringing national matters to a final *union?*

To which add, that the mode of governing adopted in this Country renders *union* at the Head more neceſſary than in other States. The diſſenſions in Parliament are ſometimes ſuch that the whole undivided efficiency of the Crown is but barely equal to the taſk of compoſing them: but what may the conſequence be expected to be, if the Head of the Government becomes the original ſeat of thoſe differences and heats, it is poſitively its office to over-rule and compoſe. Should a Council of Regency be formed, experience will ſhew they cannot poſſibly govern by the preſent mode of a *Parliament*. A Regent has no occaſion for any other Council than

than the Privy Council, as that Council is modelled.

Should the governing powers of a Regent be made leſs than thoſe of the reigning King?

NO; if the reigning King has, by the Conſtitution of the Country, but juſt power enough to go through the ſucceſsful diſcharge of his office. Thus, for inſtance, to deprive a Regent, or Repreſentative of the King, of the power of beſtowing rewards in an extenſive degree, would be hindering him from performing that very function he is expected to perform. If a King, or his Repreſentative, poſſeſſed a power of ſending *Mutes*, with *ſtrings*, to unruly Great Men, and by that means to put a ſpeedy end to differences and oppoſitions, in the manner practiſed by the Turkiſh Sultan and other Eaſtern Monarchs, the power of beſtowing rewards might perhaps be in great meaſure diſpenſed with: but as this effectual mode of governing, the *bow-ſtring*, is not adopted

in this Country, the ſofter methods of rewards, of allurements to ambition, to vanity, to avidity of every kind, become neceſſary. Should a Regent, or King's Repreſentative, be very materially reſtrained in his power of exerting the above-mentioned methods, he could not diſcharge his intended office: he would, for inſtance, find a great difficulty, in the beginning, to govern with a Parliament, that is to ſay, by means of a Parliament; and ſoon afterwards, he would find the buſineſs abſolutely impracticable.

Should the powers of the King be divided, and allotted to different diſtinct perſons?

THIS method would be liable to ſtill worſe inconveniences than the above-mentioned mode, of a *Council* of Regency. By the mode of ſuch a Council, ſome outward appearance of *unity* in the head of Government, is preſerved: though this appearance would, in the event, prove to be but fallacious. But, to allot the powers of the

Crown

Crown to diſtinct ſeparate perſons, is at once pointing out that want of unity in the Government, which ought to be hid, that is to ſay, to be hid as long as poſſible. To attempt to govern by means of ſuch diſtinct Powers, together with a ſitting Parliament, would only be adding confuſion to confuſion: the buſineſs could not go on for above ten or twelve days.

The events that took place in the abſence of King Richard may be mentioned in this place. Before ſetting out for the *Holy Land*, the King had appointed two Commiſſioners, or *Juſticiaries* of the Kingdom: the name of the one was *Longchamp*, and the other was the Biſhop of Durham. As ſoon as the King began to be *miſſing*, theſe two diſtinct Powers began to quarrel, and at laſt fought. Longchamp ſucceeded in locking up the Biſhop in the Tower. Letters were produced, as if coming from the King, ordering the Biſhop to be releaſed: but Longchamp anſwered that he knew the King's intentions too well to mind ſuch letters. The Biſhop's

friends took to other methods; which induced Longchamp to ſupply himſelf with a numerous armed guard. At length, the Nobles aſſembled in a powerful body at Reading; when Longchamp was obliged to ſhelter himſelf and alſo take his abode in the Tower; whence he eſcaped beyond ſea. If the caſe of King Richard's abſence does not ſupply a precedent concerning what is to be done in the preſent national emergency, the whole caſe at leaſt hints what ought to be *avoided*, namely, the dividing of the governing authority, in whatever ſhape ſuch diviſion may be attempted to be effected.

How is the care or cuſtody of the King, in his preſent ſituation, to be ſettled?

IT is very difficult to give a certain deciſion of the queſtion, from thoſe principles upon which the preſent national buſineſs has been taken up from the beginning.

The queſtion is the moſt important to be decided at the preſent juncture, and at

the ſame time the moſt difficult. The whole buſineſs, all together, is difficult.

The King's abſence or diſappearance was quite unforeſeen, as has been above obſerved. No previous proviſion whatever was made for the caſe. The King has diſappeared much in the ſame manner as *Palinurus*, Æneas's Pilot, was flung from the helm, being lulled aſleep by the artifice of an adverſe God in the ſhape of *Phorbas*; and, in his fall into the ſea, carried the rudder along with him, as he afterwards related to Æneas, in the ſhades.

Namque gubernaculum, multâ vi forte revulſum,
Cui datus hærebam cuſtos, curſuſque regebam;
Præcipitans traxi mecùm. ÆNEID. L. v. & vi.

There are other circumſtances of difficulty. The King's ſituation is of a very peculiar nature. It has been before mentioned that his ſituation is different from a caſe of infancy: the hour is poſitively named and known when ſuch caſe of infancy is to be ended; and the infant King's abilities increaſe and become more

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and more evident every day. But here, no future term can be named as the period to the King's ſituation. Beſides, a time may arrive when Mankind ſhall poſitively be in doubt in regard to his real caſe or ſtate. Who ſhall proclaim that the King is really returned from his abſence or captivity? that he is the ſame King who formerly governed? Who ſhall decide that he is truly George the Third? that he is the real *Don Sebaſtian?* It will perhaps be neceſſary at ſome future time to have the queſtion decided; and when it is decided, it muſt be with certainty.

Before ſuch *certain* deciſion takes place—that deciſion which nobody ſhall object to, rumours will circulate: the ſituation of the then Governors, whoever they may be, and however conjoined they may be, will perhaps prove difficult. The *abſent* King, inſtead of being a priſoner in diſtant unknown hands, or in an enemy's caſtle, like King Richard in the caſtle of the Auſtrian Duke, will perhaps turn out to be an inſtrument in the hands, or a priſoner in the caſtle

caſtle, of a faction at home: there is no foreſeeing or foretelling what in time may happen.

The vague, contradictory, reports about his ſituation may perhaps be uſed like the ghoſts of the three *Don Sebaſtians*, or of the falſe *Demetriuses* in Ruſſia, or of *Perkin Warbeck*,—keeping the then Government in a conſtant ſtate of doubt and alarm.

It will prove a ſerious diviſion of the executive authority, when ſuch a Claimant to that authority ſhall be, not come back or *returned*, for then the difficulty will likely be ended, but when a general belief ſhall continue to be promoted, that he is the next day or the day after to make his appearance.

This mode of weakening and alarming a Government, by means of a Competitor kept in a ſtate of readineſs for the purpoſe, is the method commonly uſed by the Turks for ſecuring the ſubjection of certain diſtant Provinces or Principalities. The other Eaſtern Monarchs, and the Mogul Emperors, have conſtantly practiſed the ſame expedient. And the European Nations in India have learned this kind of ſtate craft: their power

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has been both commenced and ſecured, in the Carnatic by means of *Mohammed Ali* and *Chunda-ſaheb*, and in Bengal by means of *Mir Jaffer* and *Mir Coſſim*, &c.

Who ſhall give a declaration of the King's *return:* for, ſome ſort of authentic declaration will probably be requiſite? Phyſicians, it ſeems, are to be the perſons. They have already been applied to with conſtancy and anxiety: they have given Reports *upon oath:* proviſions are moreover about to be made for the obtaining farther future Reports from them, alſo *upon their oaths.*

The Gentlemen of the Faculty are, it ſeems, to grant the King his *certificate.* By means of ſuch certificate, atteſted *upon their oaths*, the King is to be admitted to be King again—to have his *Jus poſtliminii* granted him, like a Roman Citizen who after having been taken in war by enemies, was reſtored to his former rights, upon his proving that he was the ſame perſon; thereby obtaining to have it admitted, and taken for granted, that he had never been abſent. *Quia hi qui ab hoſtibus capti ſunt, ſi reverſi fuerint*

fuerint omnia priſtina jura recipiunt; nam poſtliminium fingit eum qui captus eſt in civitate ſemper fuiſſe. Inſtit. L. i. Tit. 12.

The weighty national concern is, in ſhort, to be decided by *the oaths* of Medical Gentlemen: the government of the Nation has already moved from St. James's to Weſtminſter: there is a proſpect of its being again removed farther, and finally ſettling in the College of Phyſicians in *Warwick-Lane*. Thoughts have already been had, it is ſaid, to deſire the ſeparate Kingdom of Ireland to join, and alſo ſend Phyſicians from that Country.

The providing for the future care and guardianſhip of the King's perſon is a meaſure both of great importance, and at the ſame time, of great nicety.

The whole buſineſs of providing for the preſent national emergeney, is, all together, a buſineſs of conſiderable difficulty.

Poſſibly, the right principles from which the buſineſs might be ſettled, have not been fallen upon: owing to this, the affair offers the appearance of a *riddle*.

The Concluſion.

THE obſervations contained in the preceding pages, relative to the meaſure of forming a *Regent*, have been introduced merely by way of diſtant general hints, only fit to be attended to, in caſe the forming of a *Regent* becomes, at any future time, to be thought a neceſſary meaſure. The fact is, that, at this preſent time, there is no occaſion for a *Regent*—no buſineſs for a Regent. The Parliament now aſſembled at Weſtminſter poſſeſs powers fully ſufficient, more than ſufficient, for the governing of the Nation. They are not the *Regent* themſelves; becauſe they poſſeſs more power than a Regent, if appointed, could poſſibly alledge. A Regent could only plead a ſuppoſed Commiſſion from the King: but the Parliament now aſſembled at Weſtminſter, alledge a direct Commiſſion from the King,—an unlimited Commiſſion,—and a *ſpecial* Commiſſion too; for they alledge a Commiſſion to repreſent his Perſon, and give his *royal aſſent*.

Their Commiſſion is both ſpecial and univerſal, and unlimited.

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A Commiſſion of this nature ſets aſide the office of a Regent, ſuppoſing there exiſted one: a Regent, ſo long as a Commiſſion of this kind exiſts, becomes an uſeleſs Officer.

The Parliament having a ſpecial Commiſſion from the King, to repreſent his perſon, acting *in his name and on his behalf*, are ſuperior in point of dignity to a Regent. They are moreover greatly ſuperior to the power which a Regent could poſſibly poſſeſs: for they have more power, greatly more, than the King himſelf would enjoy, if he was preſent and actually governing in his own perſon. If the King was perſonally governing, he would not be allowed to frame Bills: the King would only be allowed to declare his opinion about Bills preſented to him, without the power of framing them: and the Parliament would only be allowed to frame Bills, without the power afterwards of *aſſenting* to them. This uſual diviſion of the ſupreme legiſlative authority certainly weakens the ſame, and renders the operations of Government dilatory; they even become, at particular times, ſluggiſh. But here, this inconvenience, this prejudicial dilatorineſs, is removed. The preſent Par-

liament, as it appears, unite in themſelves the power of framing Bills in what manner they pleaſe, and upon what matters they pleaſe, together with the power of *aſſenting* to ſuch Bills which way they chooſe. Thoſe perſons who have expreſſed wiſhes for an *efficient* Government, or efficient powers to be eſtabliſhed, at the preſent juncture, ought to be perfectly ſatisfied with the preſent courſe of meaſures. If Parliament wiſh for an *efficient* power to be formed, they need not look elſewhere than among themſelves. The Parliament now aſſembled at Weſtminſter, being inveſted with that royal Commiſſion which they are holding forth, have all they want for the purpoſe of an *efficient* Government: they can think of no perſons better circumſtanced than themſelves for governing the Country.

They can think of no perſons better circumſtanced than themſelves, that is to ſay, they are under no difficulty except that expreſſed before, in the pages 33—35, namely, the difficulty how to conſult their Conſtituents, and alſo the difficulty expreſſed in pages 46 and 47.

F I N I S.

January 23, 1789.

POSTSCRIPT.

Feb. 24th.

THE foregoing Pamphlet had been written with a view to ſhew that there muſt needs have exiſted ſome kind of important errors in the management of the late National buſineſs, ſince the progreſs of it offers a ſeries of inconſiſtencies and contradictions; (See back, pag. 39—40)—and alſo in order to ſuggeſt that poſſibly the Parliament, with thoſe claims which they had put forth and on that line which they had choſen, could not be able to go on any length, that is to ſay, for any conſiderable time.

A ſecond Part to this Pamphlet may perhaps be hereafter publiſhed. In the mean time it may be obſerved that the confuſion that has taken place in the management of the national buſineſs in the late emergency, has been in a great meaſure owing to the ſubject of the *rights* of the Heir apparent not having been at firſt introduced, or underſtood, in the pro-

pereſt manner. A ſhort explanation relative to thoſe rights of the Heir apparent may not prove unacceptable to the reader.

Has the Heir apparent a right to interfere with the royal authority in ſuch a manner as to ſet the King's rights aſide?

NO; he does not poſſeſs ſuch right, any more than any common Subject.

In what manner has the Heir apparent a right to interfere with the royal authority at the preſent juncture?

HE has a right to interfere with that authority in the capacity of a Partner, or an *Aſſiſtant*, to that authority,—an *Aſſiſtant* named, and pointed out, and provided beforehand, by the Law of the Country, for the purpoſe of ſupplying the deficiency of the Perſon with whom the actual management of the royal authority is entruſted: it is here meant to ſpeak of the caſe of a thorough deficiency, when neither orders nor directions of any kind can poſſibly be received from the Perſon to whom this royal authority is truſted. In ſuch a caſe it is

not

not only the right, but it is alſo the duty of the Heir apparent to come forth, and offer his aſſiſtance: he is like a Perſon purpoſely ſet apart, and relied upon, by the Law, for ſuch an occaſion. The meaning of his being an *Heir apparent*, is poſitively that he is inveſted with the *Office* we mention, namely, of ſupplying the thorough deficiency, or thorough abſence, an abſence amounting to death, or ſuſpicion of death, of the Perſon entruſted with the management of the royal authority.

This Office it is the right and duty of the Heir apparent to fill: the Law relies upon him—upon his coming forth immediately, whenever the caſe of ſuch thorough deficiency happens, in order to prevent the exerciſe of the royal authority from being *interrupted* thereby. And as a reward for this ſervice which the Law expects from him, namely, the prevention of the *interruption* of the royal authority, he is inveſted, in his capacity of *Heir apparent*, with certain conſiderable perſonal privileges, even during the life or the preſence of his Predeceſſor, which this Predeceſſor cannot abridge or take from him.

It may be obſerved that this political evil, the interruption of the royal authority, has been dreaded by the Law of this Country, and guarded againſt, with a ſurpriſing degree of caution. The bare thought of ſuch *interruption* is even in a manner prohibited by the Law: the King is ſuppoſed never to die; for his right is ſaid, immediately, *eo inſtanti*, to veſt in the next Heir. The proclaiming of this Heir is then a mere matter of form: and compaſſing his death, though before ſuch proclamation, is compaſſing the death of the King. (See Judge *Blackſtone*'s Commentaries, and *Jacob*'s Law Dictionary, at the Articles, King's Prerogative, and the *Perpetuity* of the King.)

In ſhort, the capacity of Heir apparent, or the *Heir-apparentſhip*, is poſitively an Office recognized by the Law of this Country, with a view to prevent the perſonal exerciſe of the royal authority from ever being *interrupted*, even by the caſe of the death of the Perſon actually entruſted with the management of this authority: the wiſdom and long experience of former ages, combined with the peculiar nature of the Government of the Country, having wrought

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a perſuaſion that the royal authority ſhould not be *interrupted*.

The next Heir apparent to a King may therefore be conſidered as a public National Officer, an Officer belonging to the Nation; and his Office, as the Law is, may be termed the Office of *Remedier and Preventer of the* interruption *of the royal authority*.

When the caſe of *interruption* exiſts, either through the death of the King, or through the ſuppoſition of his death, or through an abſolute impoſſibility of communicating with him, it is both the right and duty of the Heir apparent to come forth, and interfere with his aſſiſtance.

The aſſiſtance of the Heir apparent is then exerted by means of that power of *ratification* we have mentioned in pages 51—54. In ſuch caſe the next Heir comes forth, and proffers this ratification, which the Law has rendered neceſſary. For, the inconveniency or political evil under which both the Nation and the Government labour, in the caſe of *interruption* we are ſpeaking of, is a ſtate of doubtfulneſs concerning the exiſtence, real or political, of the King. Is

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he King; is he not? Who is the King,—the King we were uſed to, or his Heir apparent? The preſence and ratification of the Heir apparent remedies this ſtate of doubt. In the mean time no impoſition is practiſed upon the Nation. If it be not the King that has the right, it is the Heir apparent: if it be not the one, it is the other: the right lies between them both.

A few more ideas might be added concerning the rights of the Heir apparent.

A few remarks concerning the errors committed by the two oppoſite Parties, during the late proceedings. And firſt, concerning the errors committed by that Party who in the firſt inſtance introduced the queſtion of the rights of the Prince.

THEY introduced the queſtion of theſe rights too ſoon, at too early a ſtage of the buſineſs; and then, they did not preſent the queſtion in a light ſtrictly proper.

After introducing the queſtion of the rights of the Prince in a haſty manner, they deprecated the idea of treating this queſtion:

queſtion: which was tantamount to admitting, that the Prince had *no* right.

They next admitted that the Parliament had the *right* which was denied to the Prince.

The bare admitting that Parliament exiſted, *as a Parliament*, operated as an overthrow of their own cauſe. They ought to have denied the *exiſtence* of Parliament. There was a deciſive plea for that purpoſe. And the circumſtance of the Parliament having proceeded to aſſume, and diſpoſe of, the places of profit and truſt in the gift of the Crown, became an excellent ſubſidiary argument,—an argument well ſuited to the feelings of the People. Even ſuppoſing the Parliament really *exiſted* as a Parliament, they had given up their *exiſtence* and ſeats, by aſſuming and diſpoſing of Offices which, as the Law ſtands, cannot be aſſumed, or meddled with, or merely accepted, without vacating ſeats in Parliament.

Inſtead of this, they went on arguing on the ſuppoſition of the legality of the proceedings of the Parliament: even the words the *Juriſdiction* of the Parliament were ſuffered to be repeated.

Through this continuation to argue,—through their bare conſenting to talk to their Opponents, they themſelves made their own ſituation worſe and worſe every minute.

Through the bare continuance of the buſineſs and argument, the ſituation of the Prince was made deſperate in appearance, and his friends among the Nation, were rendered torpid and ſpeechleſs.

The errors of the other Party.

THAT Party whom we have above mentioned, had meant to promote what they thought the intereſts of the Prince; and alſo to ſerve themſelves; as uſual. The oppoſite Party likewiſe intended to ſerve themſelves; and, as they conceived, to take the part of the reigning King.

If they had barely oppoſed the King's authority being invaded, they might have acted properly: but they ſoon proceeded to aſſume that authority themſelves: they aſſumed to themſelves all thoſe branches of profit, power and truſt, which collectively conſtitute the authority of the Crown, and actually entered upon the buſineſs of diſpoſing of them. This bare attempt

tempt to aſſume the authorities of the Crown to themſelves was unconſtitutional: it was contrary to that Charter by which they hold their ſeats from their Conſtituents; —their Conſtituents ſend them to watch, and keep back, and check, theſe authorities of the Crown; but not to *aſſume* them.

Had they barely aſſumed thoſe authorities in the manner of a tranſient depoſit or truſt, which they meant inſtantly to convey, and convey undivided and *whole*, as a truſt ſhould be conveyed, it would not have done away the unconſtitutionalneſs of the meaſure; however, it would have greatly excuſed the ſame in the opinion of many Perſons.

But the Party did not proceed upon the diſintereſted principles we mention. They took care, before tranſmitting the depoſit, to cut it, and ſhape it, and leave their *harpoons* in it, in ſuch a manner that they might, whenever they pleaſed, pull the ſame to themſelves again.

During the ſhort time the old Fortreſs or Fortification of the CROWN was in their hands, they acted in the manner uſed by an Enemy, in a Town from which they are under a neceſſity to retreat; diſmantling

the ſame, or effecting ſuch alterations as may enable them, on ſome future opportunity, to enter again.

They left the Fortification of the CROWN deſtitute, and wide open to their future attacks; like unto Sampſon when he carried off the gates of the Town of *Gaza:*— "he took the doors of the Gates, and the "two poſts, bar and all, and putting them "upon his ſhoulders, carried them up to "the top of the hill that is before He-"bron."

Nay, the Party preſently altered their thoughts: they now deſigned to keep and appropriate to themſelves that Place into the middle of which they had introduced themſelves, upon a profeſſion of alliance and truſt:—like the Grecian Chiefs, when they let themſelves down by a rope from that huge hollow wooden *Horſe* which they had ſchemed to build, and had prevailed upon the Trojans to give admittance to, as a preſent to their Gods, and a token of returned Grecian friendſhip. They preſently ſeized upon a City immerſed "in ebriety, and "ſlew the Guard," as Virgil deſcribes; giving the names of the principal Chiefs who joyfully ſlipped down from the cavity

of the oaken *Horſe:*—*Theſſandrus, Sthelenus,* the hoſtile *Ulyſſes, Athamas, Thoas, Neoptolemus,* and the very firſt, *Machaon,*—and *Menelaus,*—and *Epeus,* the very builder of the Horſe," &c. &c.

———illos patefactus ad auras
Reddit Equus, lætique cavo ſe robore promunt
Theſſandrus, Sthelenuſque duces, et dirus Ulyſſes
Demiſſum lapſi per funem, Athamaſque, Thoaſque
Pelideſque Neoptolemus, primuſque Machaon,
Et Menelaus, et ipſe doli fabricator Epeus.
Invadunt Urbem ſomno vinoque ſepultam:
Cæduntur Vigiles;———

The ſeizure of the old Fortreſs and Fortification of the CROWN the Parliamentary Party effected, in the groſs and at one ſtroke, by aſſuming to themſelves the Great Seal of the Crown, and the Royal Aſſent; uniting the ſame to thoſe powers which they already poſſeſſed. This Great Seal and Royal Aſſent they uſed once, and were preparing to uſe a ſecond time: but ſuch ſecond or repeated uſe is immaterial to our argument: uſing a power of this kind, once, is juſt the ſame as a thouſand times.

By the courſe of meaſures which the Miniſterial and Parliamentary Party had ſucceſſively adopted, and more particularly by

by their having poſitively aſſumed the uſe of the *Royal Aſſent*, they had at length given advantages againſt themſelves greater than thoſe which had in the beginning been given to them. Theſe advantages might have been deciſively purſued in their turn; and means poſſibly exiſted by which it might have proved no impracticable taſk to take the Greek oaken *Horſe*, and all the Greeks in it, at one ſtroke.

By aſſuming the uſe of the royal Aſſent the Miniſterial and Parliamentary Party had engaged themſelves in a ſituation of the utmoſt difficulty. They had got into a lane which was no thoroughfare, and through which it was impoſſible for them to get out.

Inſtead of endeavouring "*to determine* "*on the means whereby the royal Aſſent* "*might be given in Parliament to Bills* "*paſſed by the two Houſes*," (ſee back page 40, for their Declaration) they ſhould have tried to determine on the means by which this Royal Aſſent might be *diſpenſed* with. This puts us in mind of the joke that paſſed between Alcibiades, and one of his Friends, who called upon him one day, and found him deeply engaged in thought.—What is the matter, Alcibiades? you ſeem

to

to be thoughtful.—I am conſidering how I ſhall do to pay my debts.—Well, as for me, I am engaged on quite a different ſubject; I am conſidering how I ſhall do *not* to pay mine. In like manner, the Miniſterial and Parliamentary Party, if they had been cunning, would have deliberated how they ſhould do to diſpenſe with the Royal Aſſent,—how they ſhould poſitively do without it, for governing the Country.

The event of the King's recovery has put an end to the national *Embarraſſment*. Even thoſe perſons who leaſt profeſs an underſtanding of Politics, expreſs their ſatisfaction at the change. A kind of faint, dark, remote conſciouſneſs was generally entertained that things were going down to ſome ſort of ſerious confuſion; as unavoidably perhaps as water goes ſlowly down a brook.

By the ſame event the two contending parliamentary Parties are alſo brought out of difficulty: *Sic nos ſervavit Apollo.*

Even if the King's *recovery* had not been ſo true an event as it appears it is, the ſuppoſing of the *fact*, by mutual conſent, might have been, at the preſent juncture, an eligible, wiſe meaſure.

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